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Abstract
Aiyagari (1995) showed that long-run optimal fiscal policy features a positive tax rate on capital income
in Bewley-type economies with heterogeneous agents and incomplete markets. However, determining the
magnitude of the optimal capital income tax rate was considered to be prohibitively difficult due to the
need to compute the optimal tax rates along the transition path. Contrary to this view, this paper shows
that in this class of models, long-run optimal fiscal policy and the corresponding allocation can be studied
independently of the initial conditions and the transition path. Numerical methods based on this finding are
used on a Ramsey model calibrated to the U.S. economy. I find that the observed average capital income
tax rate in the U.S. is too high, the average labor income tax rate and the debt-to-GDP ratio are too low,
compared to the long-run optimal levels. The implications of these findings for existing literature on the
optimal quantity of debt and constrained efficiency are also adressed.
1 Introduction
Aiyagari (1994a, 1995) showed that the optimal capital tax rate is positive even in the long run in Bewley-
type models, where labor income risk is not perfectly insurable.1 This result is in stark contrast with the ear-
lier results of Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985) for economies with complete financial markets.2 However,
the analysis of the Ramsey problem in Bewley-type models has remained theoretical. Quantitative studies
in the Ramsey tradition have provided only limited characterizations of optimal taxation, for instance, by
choosing tax rates that maximize long-run welfare in the economy, or by imposing non-trivial restrictions
∗I am indebted to Árpád Ábrahám, Gaetano Bloise, Chris Carroll, Yongsung Chang, Hal Cole, Jesus Fernandez-Villaverde, Jeremy
Greenwood, Piero Gottardi, Marcus Hagedorn, William Hawkins, Jonathan Heathcote, Hans Holter, Jay Hong, Jim Kahn, Baris Kaymak,
Dirk Krueger, Jose Victor Rios-Rull, Ali Shourideh, Kjetil Storesletten, Yikai Wang, and Pierre Yared for their insightful comments on
an earlier version of this paper. I also thank seminar participants at McGill University, Université de Montréal, SED 2014 Conference
in Toronto, the University of Pennsylvania, and the University of Oslo. Part of this research was conducted while I was visiting the
Department of Economics at the University of Pennsylvania and I am very grateful for their hospitality and feedback.
†Department of Economics, Yeshiva University, 500 West 185th St., New York, NY 10033. E-mail: acikgoz@yu.edu
1See Hubbard and Judd (1986), Imrohoroglu (1998), Erosa and Gervais (2002), Domeij and Heathcote (2004), Conesa, Kitao, and
Krueger (2009), Gottardi, Kajii, and Nakajima (2011), among others, for quantitative work and extensions in other environments.
2See Jones, Manuelli, and Rossi (1997), Atkeson, Chari, and Kehoe (1999), Chari and Kehoe (1999), and others for extensions.
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on the policy tools available to the government. A quantitative analysis of long-run optimal taxation was
considered to be a daunting task, because it was believed that the long-run allocation was dependent on the
initial conditions of the economy as well as the transition path, as in models with complete markets.3
The main contribution of this paper is to show that this premise is premature in an infinite-horizon
model with incomplete markets and heterogeneous agents. Using the necessary conditions for optimality, I
illustrate that the long-run income tax rates, level of government debt, and the distribution of wealth and
consumption can be investigated independently of the transition path, and without taking a stand on the
initial conditions of an economy.4 I develop and apply numerical methods that rely on this observation to
compute these levels for the U.S. economy using a very standard Ramsey model with government debt. A
simple comparison of the quantitative results with the corresponding values for the U.S. economy suggests
that, (i) the government debt-to-GDP ratio is too low and ought to be much higher, (ii) the average labor
income tax rate in the U.S. economy ought to be higher, and (iii) the average capital income tax rate ought
to be much lower than the currently observed levels.
The disconnect between the long-run properties of the optimal fiscal policy and the initial conditions
arises from some of the characteristic features of Bewley-type models. If there are tight borrowing con-
straints, so that some agents are credit-constrained in each period, the planner effectively discounts the
distortionary effects of future taxes at a rate heavier than the social discount rate. When distortions are
irrelevant asymptotically in this sense, the relative tax rates on different sources of income are determined
by their relative distortionary effects in the long run. In a Bewley-type environment, these relative effects
can be evaluated based exclusively on the properties of the economy in the long run, since the long-run allo-
cation, as well as factor supply elasticities are characterized by a stationary distribution that is independent
of the initial conditions. Although the Ramsey problem is non-stationary in general, in this environment, all
history-dependent variables follow an ergodic process, and the solution to the Ramsey problem resembles
that of a stationary growth model. In the long run, fiscal policy and the induced allocation depend only on
the “deep parameters” of the model along with the underlying income process.
The seemingly extreme quantitative results for the U.S. economy are not surprising once we understand
how the policy tools available to the government interact with the main frictions in a Bewley-type economy.
By issuing debt, the government effectively relaxes the borrowing constraints of private agents.5 The govern-
3In Aiyagari (1994a)’s words (pg. 21-22), “[The question of whether actual tax policy is long-run optimal] can only be resolved by
computing the solution path for the optimal tax problem and the associated limiting values. This computational problem is very hard,...
because the consumer’s problem is non-stationary and one of the state variables for the economy is the cross-section distribution of
asset holdings, which is an infinite dimensional variable.”
4This is in sharp contrast to models with certainty or complete markets. Surprisingly, in these models, without making a reference to
the initial conditions, we can say very little aside from optimal zero capital income tax in the long run. See Lucas (1990) and Auerbach
and Kotlikoff (1987) for further details.
5See Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998), Altig and Davis (1989), Hayashi (1985), Heathcote (2005), Holmstrom and Tirole (1998),
Hubbard and Judd (1986), Kocherlakota (2007), Vissing-Jorgensen and Krishnamurthy (2008), Shapiro and Slemrod (2003), Woodford
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ment finances the interest payments on steady-state debt by taxing labor income heavily, reducing the share
of income that is stochastic, and effectively attenuating the income risk the private agents face. The quanti-
tative results suggest that in the long run, it is efficient for the government to maintain the maximal debt that
can be supported under the modified golden rule, i.e. when capital-labor ratio (or capital intensity) is equal
to the first-best level. Given an exogenous level of government spending, this is equivalent to attaining the
peak of the “steady-state Laffer Curve”. Along with high labor income tax rates, the government achieves a
close-to-minimal average labor income share in the economy. In the long run, instead of imposing high cap-
ital tax rates to suppress precautionary motives for asset accumulation, the government acts to alleviate the
source of the problem that leads to inefficient level of savings. Perhaps not surprisingly, the need to finance a
stream of government expenditures has nothing to do with the qualitative features of long-run optimal fiscal
policy, supporting the view that inefficiencies induced by incomplete markets drive these results.
The quantitative exercise in this paper also suggests that the Ramsey planner delivers a flow welfare level
in the long run that is significantly lower than those that can be achieved by alternative tax rates. This result
warns us about the quantitative literature that relies exclusively on maximizing the flow welfare in the long
run. There are at least two reasons why such limited results are misleading. First, given the initial state of
the economy, transition to a candidate steady state (in particular, one that maximizes welfare in the long
run) can potentially require extreme policy measures to be implemented over any feasible transition path. In
this case, a benevolent tax authority would not implement a policy that leads to the prescribed steady state
since the policy would not be ex-ante optimal. Such fiscal policy reform might not even be politically feasible
due to the heavy burden it imposes on the initial periods/generations. Second, a pure steady-state analysis
disregards the intertemporal incentives of the tax authority. By contrast, using the necessary conditions for
optimality, I look specifically for long-run optimal allocations that could be achieved following an optimal
transition path. In the quantitative section, I illustrate that a social planner who maximizes the flow welfare
in the long run would choose a very high capital income tax rate, a very low labor income tax rate, and a
negative government debt for the U.S. economy, qualitatively the complete opposite of the long-run optimal
fiscal policy.
The steady-state results I provide downplay the appeal of providing a complete solution to the Ramsey
problem for the sole purpose of determining long-run optimal fiscal policy. Therefore, an optimal transition
analysis is left for future research. On the other hand, the results highlight the importance of the transition
path in evaluating the source of the welfare gains. Since, by construction, the Ramsey planner maximizes
average discounted welfare over the entire time horizon, and settles with a relatively low steady-state wel-
fare, studying the optimal transition path is the only way to understand where the welfare gains come from.
(1990), and Yotsuzuka (1987).
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To gain some insight on these issues, I provide a constrained transition analysis where I illustrate the ex-
istence of feasible and welfare-improving dynamic paths leading to the long-run optimal allocation, even
when the economy starts from an allocation that features the highest possible steady-state welfare. In all of
these transition paths, welfare gains come from consumption front-loading, and/or a significant reduction
in consumption inequality.
The following section presents the benchmark model and the notions of equilibrium in detail. Section
3 is a steady-state analysis of the Ramsey problem under incomplete markets, illustrating the main result
of the paper. This is followed by calibration of the benchmark model in Section 4, and quantitative results
for the U.S. economy in Section 5. Section 6 provides a constrained transition analysis of the optimal fiscal
policy. Section 7 contains a literature review and a discussion of the main findings in relation to the earlier
results. Section 8 concludes the paper.
2 The Model
In this section, I provide the details of the optimal fiscal policy problem in a Bewley-type model with het-
erogeneous agents and incomplete markets. To facilitate a comparative discussion, I consider a setup that is
very similar to the one used by Aiyagari (1994a).
2.1 The Environment
Time t ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,∞} is discrete. There is a continuum of ex-ante identical households of measure one, a
representative competitive firm, and a benovelent government that has access to a commitment technology.
There are no aggregate shocks.
The government taxes or subsidizes capital income at rate τkt, market labor income at rate τnt. It also
issues debt Bt, and finances an exogenous and constant stream of government expenditures Gt = G.6
Without loss of generality, I assume that tax burden is on the households. Let rt and wt represent the interest
rate and the wage at time t and let r¯t = (1− τkt)rt ≥ 0 and w¯t = (1− τnt)wt ≥ 0 represent factor prices net
of taxes.
Households
In every period, each household is subject to an idiosyncratic labor productivity shock et ∈ E that follows
a discrete, first-order Markov process. I assume that this process has a unique non-degenerate stationary
6None of the results highlighted in this paper depend on the assumption that government expenditures are constant, as long as the
expenditures converge to some fixed level G in the long run.
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distribution pi  0. Let (E, E) denote the measurable space of productivity where E denotes all subsets
of E. Let (Et, Et) denote the product space of labor efficiency shocks up to and including period t. Let
ht = {e0, e1, e2, . . . , et} ∈ Et represent a particular realization of idiosyncratic productivities up until time t
and define Π : Et → [0, 1] to denote the probability measure over the product space of labor productivities.
With some abuse of notation, I use Π(ht) to denote the date-0 probability of realization of the history of
shocks ht. Assuming that a law of large numbers holds, Π(ht) also represents the mass of agents with
this particular realization of history at time t. In period 0, agents draw idiosyncratic productivity from the
unconditional distribution pi.
Financial markets are incomplete and agents only have access to a single risk-free asset at. In each
period, agents are subject to an exogenous borrowing constraint at+1 ≥ −a that is tighter than the natural
borrowing limit. LetA = [−a,∞) ⊂ R denote the space for assets. For illustrative purposes and to rationalize
an egalitarian objective, I assume that all agents enter period-0 with assets a0. I relax this assumption later
for the quantitative results.
Households have access to two productive technologies. They can either work in the market (using a
fraction 0 ≤ nt ≤ 1 of total time) and earn the market wage net of taxes, etw¯tnt, or use the alternative
tax-free home-production technology H(1−nt) which satisfies H ′(1−n) > 0, H ′′(1−n) < 0, and H(0) = 0.
Every period, given a post-tax wage level w¯t and labor efficiency et, a household divides time optimally
between the two production technologies. It is clear that there is no income effect on labor supply in this
model.7 The total labor income of a household, yt(ht, w¯t), and supply of market hours, nt(ht, w¯t), satisfy
yt(h
t, w¯t) = y(et, w¯t) = max
0≤nt≤1
H(1− nt) + etntw¯t for each t, ht, (1)
nt(h
t, w¯t) = n(et, w¯t) = argmax
0≤nt≤1
H(1− nt) + etntw¯t for each t, ht. (2)
The budget constraint of a household is
ct(h
t) + at+1(h
t) ≤ at(ht−1)(1 + r¯t) + y(ht, w¯t) for each t, ht (3)
at+1(h
t) ≥ −a for each t, ht
7This specification is very useful as a benchmark. First, many results, in particular, related to the existence of a solution, are available
for this particular environment in Aiyagari (1995). Second, the absence of wealth effect makes many of the implications of this model
more transparent. For instance, the choice of w¯ is essentially equivalent to the choice of the stochastic process the households take
exogenously. In addition, with this specification, leisure is not valued in the utility function, allowing us to concentrate only on the
impact of policy on the intertemporal allocation of consumption. The distinction drawn between a complete markets and an incomplete
markets economy in the later sections does not rely on this particular assumption.
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Households derive utility from consumption goods and their objective is to solve
V H(a0; r¯, w¯) = max{at+1(ht),ct(ht)}
∞∑
t=0
βt
∑
ht∈Et
Π(ht)u(ct(h
t)) (4)
subject to (1) and (3), given the sequence of post-tax prices r¯ = {r¯0, r¯1, . . . }, w¯ = {w¯0, w¯1, . . . }, and initial
condition a0(h−1) = a0.
I assume that the per-period utility function u(c) satisfies the standard assumptions u′(c) > 0, u′′(c) < 0,
limc→0 u′(c) = ∞. In addition, following the literature on incomplete markets, I assume that there exist
constants c¯, σ > 0 such that −u′′(c)c/u′(c) ≤ σ for all c ≥ c¯. The last assumption ensures (when the shocks
are i.i.d.) that the level of assets remain bounded in the long run for each agent, provided that the long-run
return on assets is lower than the inverse of the discount rate.8
The policy functions solve the following system of necessary conditions:9
u′(ct(ht)) ≥ β(1 + r¯t+1)
∑
ht+1∈Et+1
Π(ht+1|ht)u′(ct+1(ht+1)) for each t, ht (5)
(at+1(h
t) + a)
(
u′(ct(ht))− β(1 + r¯t+1)
∑
ht+1∈Et+1
Π(ht+1|ht)u′(ct+1(ht+1))
)
= 0 for each t, ht (6)
at+1(h
t) + a ≥ 0 for each t, ht (7)
Let gt : Et → A denote the policy function for assets; gt is measurable with respect to (Et, Et).
Representative Firm
The output net of depreciation, F (K,N) is constant-returns-to-scale, satisfying the usual neoclassical as-
sumptions FK > −δ, FN > 0, FKK < 0, FNN < 0, limK→0 FK =∞, limN→0 FN =∞.
The firm’s objective is to maximize profits in each period t. Therefore the following conditions are
satisfied:
8See Aiyagari (1994b) for a proof of existence of an upper bound on assets for the case in which the shocks are i.i.d. To the best of my
knowledge, there is no general proof of assets being bounded in the long run when the shocks follow a Markov process. Miao (2002)
excludes the natural borrowing limit case and obtains the boundedness result for a restrictive class of first-order Markov processes.
Due to absence of general theoretical results, following the literature, I verify this property quantitatively. On the other hand, assets
being bounded is a sufficient condition for the Ramsey problem to be well-defined. A stationary invariant distribution for assets might
exist and per-capita levels of all quantities can be bounded even when the relevant state space is not compact. See Szeidl (2013).
Unfortunately, theoretical results in this direction are limited.
9This model specification is observationally equivalent to a model with Greenwood-Hercowitz-Huffman (GHH) preferences. To see
this, let per-period utility function equal u(c˜ + H(1 − n)) and budget constraint satisfy c˜t(ht) + at+1(ht) ≤ at(ht−1)(1 + r¯t) +
w¯tetnt(ht), where c˜t(ht), at+1(ht+1) ≥ 0. Now, observe that once we redefine consumpion as c ≡ c˜ + H(1 − n) and let the agent
choose variable c instead of c˜, we recover the preferences and the budget set for the benchmark model.
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rt = FK(Kt, Nt) (8)
wt = FN (Kt, Nt).
The Government
The government has the following budget constraint in each period:
rtτktAt + wtτntNt +Bt+1 ≥ Gt + (1 + rt)Bt
where At = Kt +Bt is the aggregate assets held by the households in the economy.
Using the CRS assumption for the market technology, adding F (Kt, Nt) to both sides, one can express
this constraint in terms of post-tax prices:
Gt + (1 + r¯t)Bt + r¯tKt + w¯tNt ≤ F (Kt, Nt) +Bt+1 (9)
2.2 Competitive Equilibrium and the Ramsey Problem
The competitive equilibrium in this economy can be defined in the standard way.
Definition 1 For given initial conditions (a0, B0) and time paths r¯, w¯, B, a competitive equilibrium with
fiscal policy consists of a household value function V H(.); household policy functions gt(.), nt(.); and sequences
Ct, Kt, Nt, Ht, At, rt, and wt such that the following are satisfied:
1. The policy function gt(.) and value function V H(.) solve problem (4), nt(.) satisfies equation (2),
2. Given the sequence of factor prices rt, wt, the representative firm maximizes profits: Kt and Nt satisfy (8),
3. The government resource constraint (9) is satisfied.
4. All markets clear:
Asset market clearing
Kt = At −Bt for each t (10)
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Goods market clearing
Ct +Gt +Kt+1 = F (Kt, Nt) +Ht +Kt for each t (11)
Labor market clearing
Nt =
∑
ht∈Et
Π(ht)etnt(h
t, w¯t) for each t (12)
Sequences At+1 and Ht are generated by household policy functions:
At+1 =
∑
ht∈Et
Π(ht)gt(h
t; r¯, w¯) for each t (13)
Ht =
∑
ht∈Et
Π(ht)H(1− nt(ht, w¯t)) for each t.
In period 0, government chooses a sequence of prices r¯, w¯, and debt B in order to maximize a utilitar-
ian aggregate of sum of discounted utilities for all households, subject to market clearing and government
resource constraints. This defines the Ramsey problem in this environment.
Definition 2 Given the initial level of assets a0 and government debt B0, household policy functions gt(.) and
nt(.), and the exogenous government expenditure process Gt, the Ramsey Problem consists of the choice of
sequences of post-tax factor prices r¯ = {r¯0, r¯1, ...}, w¯ = {w¯0, w¯1, ...}, and government debt B = {B1, B2, ...}
that solve
V (a0, B0) = max
r¯,w¯,B
V H(a0, r¯, w¯) (14)
subject to (9), (10), (12), and (13), given a0, B0.10
It is clear that every solution to the Ramsey Problem is a competitive equilibrium allocation with taxes.
Since household policy functions depend on prices in all periods, a marginal change in date-t post-tax prices
would in general alter consumption and savings decisions for all periods.11 One standard way to simplify this
problem is to use the first-order necessary conditions for the household’s problem as implementability con-
straints for the planner’s problem. This approach is valid since, given any sequence of prices, the household’s
10Goods market clearing condition (11) is redundant. To see this, summing over individual budget constraints (3) gives us Ct +
At+1 = (1 + r¯t)At + w¯tNt + Ht. Combining this equality with the government budget constraint (9), we obtain the goods market
clearing condition.
11Due to absence of wealth effect on labor supply, this is not true for labor supply decisions. Labor supply at time t is only affected by
the post-tax wage level at time t.
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problem is convex. The first-order conditions of the household, (5), (6) and (7), along with a transversality
condition, are necessary and sufficient for an optimum.
V (a0, B0) = max{r¯t,w¯t,Bt+1,at+1(ht),ct(ht)}
∞∑
t=0
βt
∑
ht∈Et
Π(ht)u(ct(h
t)) (15)
subject to (3), (5), (6), (7), (9), and
Kt+1 =
∑
ht∈Et
Π(ht)at+1(h
t)−Bt+1 for each t
Nt =
∑
ht∈Et
Π(ht)etnt(h
t, w¯t) for each t
given (1), (2), and initial conditions a0(h−1) = a0 and B0.
Next, I write a Lagrangian for problem (15). Let βtΠ(ht)θt+1(ht) and βtΠ(ht)ηt+1(ht) represent the
Lagrange multipliers for (5) and (6) respectively. For convenience, define the following auxilary variable:
λt+1(h
t) ≡ ηt+1(ht)(at+1(ht) + a)− θt+1(ht). (16)
By carrying terms across time periods, I obtain the following formulation, incorporating only the dynamic
implementability constraints into the objective function:
L =
∞∑
t=0
βt
∑
ht∈Et
Π(ht)
[
u(ct(h
t)) + u′(ct(ht))
[
λt(h
t−1)(1 + r¯t)− λt+1(ht)
]]
(17)
subject to (3), (7), (9), (16), and
Kt+1 =
∑
ht∈Et
Π(ht)at+1(h
t)−Bt+1 for each t
Nt =
∑
ht∈Et
Π(ht)etnt(h
t, w¯t) for each t
given (1), (2), and initial conditions a0(h−1) = a0, B0 and λ0(h−1) = 0.
Observe that agents start with λt(ht) equal to zero since at period-0, there are no “Euler equation
promises” to be kept, therefore θ0(h−1), η0(h−1) = 0.
Problem (15) is not stationary and it involves constraints that are forward-looking. For instance, choice
variable r¯t+1 shows up as part of Euler equation constraints that belong to period t. Therefore, recursive
methods cannot be applied directly. Following Marcet and Marimon (2011), I expand the state space of the
problem to include Lagrange multipliers of the dynamic implementability constraints to recover stationarity.
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To be more precise, although the primary problem (15) does not admit a recursive structure, the Lagrangian
(17) does, once we keep track of the auxilary variables (16) along with the usual state variables, assets and
labor efficiency. Since there is a continuum of households, the relevant state variable for the Ramsey planner
is the joint distribution of these three variables.12
Let L = R represent the space for λ. For the recursive representation, I relax the assumption that agents
are ex ante identical. I index all households by (s, e) ≡ (a, λ, e) ∈ A × L × E. Let Σs represent the Borel σ-
algebra on A×L, and Σ represent the product σ-algebra on A×L×E. P represents the set of all probability
measures over Σ with typical elements µ, µ′ ∈ P.
Let µ˜0 denote the initial distribution of households on A×E space and let µ0 denote the trivial extension
of this distribution on A× L × E space with all probability mass on λ = 0. Then, the objective of the social
planner can be represented by W (µ0, B0) where W : P× R→ R solves:
W (µ,B) = min
θ′(.),η′(.)≥0
max
r¯,w¯,B′,a′(.),c(.)
∑
e
∫
u(c(.)) + u′(c(.))
[
λ(1 + r¯)− λ′(.)]µ(ds, e) + βW (µ′, B′) (18)
subject to
c(.) + a′(.) ≤ a(1 + r¯) + y(e, w¯) a.e. µ (19)
a′ + a ≥ 0 a.e. µ
G+ (1 + r¯)B + r¯K + w¯N = F (K,N) +B′
K =
∑
e
∫
aµ(ds, e)−B
N =
∑
e
∫
en(e, w¯)µ(ds, e) =
∑
e
pieen(e, w¯)
µ′(S′, e′) =
∑
e
piee′
∫
I[(a′(.), λ′(.)) ∈ S′]µ(ds, e) for each S′ ∈ Σs and each e′ ∈ E
given (1) and (2), where a′(µ,B, s, e), and c(µ,B, s, e) denote the choice of assets and consumption respec-
tively, and
λ′(µ,B, s, e) ≡ η′(µ,B, s, e)(a′(µ,B, s, e) + a)− θ′(µ,B, s, e).
12Marcet and Marimon (2011) construct the recursive Lagrangian by “dualizing” the dynamic incentive constraints (equations (5) and
(6), in this case) period by period, assuming that the solution to the primal problem is a saddle-point of the corresponding Lagrangian.
An earlier draft of their paper (1994) features the Ramsey problem under complete markets as an example whose formulation looks
very similar to this model.
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I[.] is the indicator function taking a value of 1 if the condition in the brackets is true, and 0 otherwise.13
For the rest of the exposition, I will denote the policy functions for assets and the induced auxilary
variables by a′ = g(µ,B, s, e) and λ′ = h(µ,B, s, e), respectively. It is well-known that the set of feasible
allocations in Ramsey problem is not convex in general, unless we make very strong assumptions on prefer-
ences and production function. Following the large body of literature on Ramsey taxation, and recognizing
the potential shortcomings, I rely on the necessary conditions for optimality for all the results that follow. In
the Appendix, I show that the following first-order conditions are necessary at an interior (with respect to
policy variables r¯, w¯, and B) solution to the Ramsey problem.
Proposition 1 An interior solution to the Ramsey problem satisfies the following conditions:
λ′ = h(.) : u′(c) ≥ β(1 + r¯′)E[u′(c′)|e] with equality if a′ > −a, a.e. µ
a′ = g(.) : u′(c) + u′′(c)
[
λ(1 + r¯)− λ′] = β(1 + r¯′)E[u′(c′) + u′′(c′)[λ′(1 + r¯′)− λ′′]|e]
+ βγ′(FK(K ′, N ′)− r¯′) if a′ > −a, otherwise λ′ = 0, a.e. µ
B′(µ,B) : γ = β(1 + FK(K ′, N ′))γ′
r¯(µ,B) : γA =
∑
e
∫
u′(c)λµ(ds, e)+
∑
e
∫
a
(
u′(c) + u′′(c)
[
λ(1 + r¯)− λ′])µ(ds, e)
w¯(µ,B) : γN = γ(FN (K,N)− w¯)N ′(w¯) +
∑
e
∫
en(e, w¯)
(
u′(c) + u′′(c)
[
λ(1 + r¯)− λ′])µ(ds, e)
where γ is the multiplier for the government budget constraint.
Observe that at an optimal solution, a functional household Euler equation must be satisfied. Due
to the particular structure of this problem, the household-specific multiplier λ does not appear directly
in this equation. This property will allow me to conjecture that the policy function for assets satisfies
a′ = g(µ,B, a, λ, e) = g(µ,B, a, λ˜, e), for all λ, λ˜ ∈ L. Note that if this property does not hold over a set
of agents with positive measure, the planner effectively chooses different consumption and savings for two
types of households with the same asset and labor efficiency levels, but with different histories (hence λ).
Clearly, this cannot hold over an optimal path since this would violate the sequences of implementability
constraints for at least one of those households.14 This is not equivalent to stating that these multipliers are
13An alternative way to set up this problem is to use the following simpler implementability constraint that combines (5), (6), and
(7):
u′(ct(ht)) = max
{
u(ct(h
t)), β(1 + r¯t+1)
∑
ht+1∈Et+1
Π(ht+1|ht)u′(ct+1(ht+1))
}
for each t, ht
where ct(h
t) represents the consumption level when at+1(ht) = −a. Assigning multipliers βtΠ(ht)λt+1(ht) to these constraints, and
following very similar steps, we get a very similar recursive formulation with identical implications for the solution.
14Assuming that the solution to the recursive problem is equivalent to the solution to the sequential problem, the time-series generated
by the recursive problem must be consistent with the consumption-savings plans of households who take the sequence of prices as given,
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irrelevant. The distribution of multipliers is a component of the planner’s state variable µ, and matters for the
planner’s choice of post-tax prices; this can be seen in the first-order conditions for r¯ and w¯. These post-tax
prices, in turn, show up in the household’s Euler equation and so affect consumption and saving. However,
conditional on the distribution of multipliers, two households with the same assets and labor efficiency will
have the same consumption and saving, independent of their particular values of λ. I will henceforth assume
that the policy function for assets takes the form a′ = g(µ,B, a, e), which simplifies the problem significantly.
3 Steady-State Analysis of the Ramsey Problem
Having provided the details of the model, I next seek the answer to the following question: Which steady
states, if any, could be optimal in the long run? This is not merely an investigation of a steady state that
maximizes flow welfare at the steady state. By contrast, this is an investigation of the limiting values of the
policy variables of an optimal transition. In particular, government’s discounting over the entire planning
horizon is taken into account. For the discussion that follows, I will refer to these limiting values and the
induced allocation as the “long-run optimal steady states”, or “Ramsey steady states.”
This “steady state refinement” turns out to be quite powerful. For many parameterizations of the model,
quantitative results show that a unique steady state survives this refinement. This property is in sharp
contrast with environments without frictions. It is well known that the complete markets benchmark can
accommodate multiple steady states, each of which can potentially be optimal for a different set of initial
conditions. Indeed, in the Chamley-Judd benchmark, there is no way of figuring out the long-run optimal
labor taxes, government debt, private assets, and consumption levels without providing a complete solution
to the problem, and without taking a stand on the initial conditions of the economy.15
3.1 Complete vs. Incomplete Markets
To understand why we have an indeterminacy in the complete markets benchmark, it is illuminating to take
a closer look at the first-order necessary conditions of the planner for a version of the benchmark model
without uncertainty. To this end, I seek the steady state of the Ramsey problem with no idiosyncratic risk in
which consumption C, private assets A, post-tax prices r¯, w¯, government debt B, and exogenous government
expenditure G are constant. Below, I provide only a heuristic characterization of the steady state under
complete markets since the detailed proofs are available in Chamley (1986) for a slightly different version of
since these are internalized by the implementability conditions.
15See Lucas (1990) for a discussion of this point for an infinite-horizon model. Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) make the same point
for a life-cycle model.
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the same model. The following equations constitute the first-order necessary conditions of a planner when
there are no idiosyncratic shocks:
λt+1 : u
′(Ct) = β(1 + r¯t+1)u′(Ct+1) (20)
At+1 : u
′(Ct) + u′′(Ct)
[
λt(1 + r¯t)− λt+1
]
= β(1 + r¯t+1)
[
u′(Ct+1) + u′′(Ct+1)
[
λt+1(1 + r¯t+1)− λt+2
]]
(21)
+ βγt+1(FK(Kt+1, Nt+1)− r¯t+1)
Bt+1 : γt = β(1 + FK(Kt+1, Nt+1))γt+1 (22)
r¯t : γtAt = u
′(Ct)λt +At
(
u′(Ct)+u′′(Ct)
[
λt(1 + r¯t)− λt+1
])
(23)
w¯t : γtNt = γt(FN (Kt, Nt)− w¯t)N ′(w¯t) +Nt(w¯t)
(
u′(Ct) + u′′(Ct)
[
λt(1 + r¯t)− λt+1
])
(24)
Absent idiosycratic risk, since C = Ct = Ct+1 at a steady state, the household’s Euler equation (20)
reads β(1 + r¯) = 1. The government’s Euler equation (22) implies the modified golden rule holds, i.e.
β(1 + FK(K,N)) = 1 at a steady state.16 Combining these two equations, as one would expect, I obtain the
Chamley-Judd zero capital tax result r¯ = r = FK(K,N). It is straightforward to show that imposing the
zero-tax result, the first-order condition for assets (equation (21)) becomes redundant. Now, observe that
the steady-state versions of the first-order conditions for r¯ and w¯ (equations (23) and (24)), the modified
golden rule expression β(1 + FK(K,N)) = 1, along with steady-state household and government budget
constraints constitute five independent equations with six unknowns w¯, B, A, C, λ, and γ (treating labor
supply N(w¯) as a function of w¯).17
What causes this system to be underdetermined in the Chamley-Judd benchmark? Since capital income
tax is non-distortionary in the initial period, it is efficient to impose confiscatory capital income taxes. Fol-
lowing the initial period, optimal capital tax rate converges to zero very rapidly, and in a large class of
models, this rate is independent of the initial conditions.18 The optimal policy, under complete markets, is to
front-load all intertemporal distortions, which is shown rigorously in a more general framework by Albanesi
16Straub and Werning (2014) recently emphasized that convergence of γ and λ to finite non-zero values was taken for granted, both
by Judd (1985) and Chamley (1986), and provided examples under which this property does not hold. However, when government
can issue debt, as in Chamley (1986) and in my benchmark model, this problem does not arise unless the initial debt is too high or the
constraints on tax levels are too tight.
17One can show that the optimal solution features λt = φat for all t ≥ T + 1 where T is the last period in which the constraint
r¯t ≥ 0 binds. The value of φ ≥ 0 is completely determined by the initial conditions. If the government can raise enough tax revenue to
cover the present value of all expenditures in period-0, φ equals zero.
18For instance, when the utility function is separable in consumption and leisure, and consumption utility function is of the CRRA
type, optimal capital tax rate is zero for all t ≥ 1. See Chari and Kehoe (1999). Obviously, this result holds true for more general
environments if the initial capital levy equals the present value of all government expenditures. This is equivalent to having access to a
lump-sum tax, since the government does not need to resort to distortionary taxation.
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and Armenter (2012). However, the fact that capital income should not be taxed in the long run is not suf-
ficient to define the optimal long-run policy completely. Given that capital tax rate ought to be zero except
for the few initial periods, the present value of labor income tax revenue is determined, to a large extent,
by the initial debt and present value of government expenditures net of initial capital levy available to the
government. The level of debt to be serviced in the long run, and the long-run labor income tax are jointly
determined by the optimal way to smooth these tax distortions over time.
Another way to see this point is to look at the structure of the representative household’s problem. With
no idiosyncratic risk and no borrowing constraints, given any sequence of prices (r¯, w¯) that converge to
steady-state values, the representative household’s Euler equation holds with equality in every period t.
Therefore, the initial level of assets (along with a transversality condition) determines the consumption and
asset levels at the steady state. It is clear that there is no hope of studying the steady-state levels of these
variables without making a reference to the initial conditions. Indeed, since β(1 + r¯) = β(1 + FK) = 1
holds, the steady-state version of the household’s Euler equation provides us no information about the level
of consumption in the long run.19
This observation led many economists to conjecture that an analogous result holds in economies with
incomplete markets and heterogeneous agents, i.e. the premise that long-run optimal fiscal policy and
allocation depend on initial conditions of the economy. I argue below that the problem of indeterminacy,
a characteristic of complete markets economy, does not arise in a Bewley-type economy. For the discussion
that follows, I provide the steady-state versions of the optimality conditions in Proposition 1, where I drop
the distribution as a state variable due to stationarity.20
19When we add more features into the model that allows us to extract more information from the steady-state Euler equation
regarding consumption/savings level in the long run, the long-run indeterminacy result does not hold, even under complete markets.
For instance, suppose that the discount rate of private agents depends endogenously on the consumption level. (So that household
discount rate equals β˜(Ct) and the planner’s discount rate equals β). In this environment, assuming convergence, zero capital tax
result still holds, but the steady-state Euler equations pin down the consumption level, since β˜(C)(1 + r¯) = β(1 + FK) = 1 must
be satisfied. For details, see Theorem 5 in Judd (1985). This simple example suggests that the relevance of initial conditions for the
long-run fiscal policy is more of an exception than the rule, and it seems to be very specific to the Chamley-Judd environment.
20Observe that I assume implicitly that the joint distribution of (a, λ, e) converges to a stationary invariant distribution. A potential
problem arises from the fact that under the given assumptions, there is no guarantee that λ is bounded or that there is an ergodic set
for λ. The numerical algorithm explained in the Appendix reveals that, under the additional assumption that multiplier γ converges
to a finite, non-zero value, λ follows an ergodic process and such a stationary joint distribution exists. Aiyagari (1995) assumes that
government spending is endogenous to guarantee that 0 < γ <∞ in the long run since γ is equal to the marginal utility of government
spending. However, he noted that this property still holds even when government expenditure is exogenous. See footnote 15 in Aiyagari
(1995). Recently, Pikkety and Saez (2013) validated this claim.
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λ′(a, λ, e) : u′(c) ≥ β(1 + r¯)E[u′(c′)|e] with equality if a′ > −a (25)
a′(a, λ, e) : u′′(c)
[
λ(1 + r¯)− λ′] = β(1 + r¯)E[u′′(c′)[λ′(1 + r¯)− λ′′]|e] (26)
+ βγ(FK(K,N)− r¯) if a′ > −a, otherwise λ′ = 0
r¯ : γA =
∑
e
∫
u′(c)λµ(ds, e)+
∑
e
∫
a
(
u′(c) + u′′(c)
[
λ(1 + r¯)− λ′])µ(ds, e) (27)
w¯ : γN = γ(FN (K,N)− w¯)N ′(w¯) +
∑
e
∫
en(e, w¯)
(
u′(c) + u′′(c)
[
λ(1 + r¯)− λ′])µ(ds, e) (28)
My argument hinges critically on the optimal positive capital income tax result provided by Aiyagari
(1995). He proved, as an intermediate step, that the modified golden rule property still holds in this en-
vironment; this follows from the steady-state version of the government’s Euler equation. It is well-known
that, as long as there is idiosyncratic risk, β(1+ r¯) < 1 is necessary for the stationarity of the joint distribution
of assets and labor efficiency in the long run.21 Aiyagari’s (1995) long-run optimal positive capital income
tax result, r¯ < FK , follows immediately from these two observations.
Observe that, given any optimal steady-state candidate post-tax prices (r¯, w¯) such that β(1+ r¯) < 1 holds,
standard methods in Aiyagari (1994b) and Huggett (1993) can be used to solve the household Euler equation
for the saving policy in the long run. Equilibrium saving policy, under standard technical conditions, provides
us the stationary distribution of assets and consumption. All of this is possible thanks to a particular feature
of Bewley-type models: Given that β(1 + r¯) < 1 holds and the households face idiosyncratic uncertainty, the
tension between impatience and the incentives to engage in precautionary saving ultimately defines a stable
invariant distribution, whose moments pin down the steady-state aggregate levels of household variables.22
In a nutshell, any candidate long-run optimal price pair (r¯, w¯) determines the average levels of private assets
and consumption under incomplete markets. In the complete markets benchmark, none of them do! I
exploit this feature to solve the system of necessary conditions to characterize long-run optimal fiscal policy
and allocation without having to solve for the transition. This is possible because the relevant system of
equations is not underdetermined.
Why is it the case that we can study long-run optimal fiscal policy in a Bewley-type economy independent
of the initial conditions? Assuming that the solution converges to a steady state, we can suggest a particular
characteristic of Bewley-type models to be responsible for this result: As long as the borrowing constraints are
tighter than the natural borrowing limits, and β(1 + r¯) < 1 holds, every agent hits the borrowing constraint
21See Schechtman and Escudero (1977) and Chamberlain and Wilson (2000).
22See Deaton (1991), Carroll (1997), Szeidl (2013), and others for an extensive discussion.
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infinitely often.23 Every time an agent faces the borrowing constraint, the process that determines the
intertemporal allocation of resources is “reset,” resulting in history-independence. From a date-0 planner’s
perspective, marginal change in the tax rate in period t sufficiently far into the future has no effect on an
agent’s saving decision for earlier time periods due to the wedge in the Euler equation for periods in which
the agent hits the borrowing constraint. Suppose that a positive mass φt > 0 of agents are borrowing
constrained in period t and define φ ≡ limt→∞ φt. In this economy, the planner discounts the distortionary
effects of future taxes at a factor roughly on the order of magnitude of [β(1 − φ)], which is heavier than
the social discount factor β. Hence, the socially efficient way to allocate the tax burden, more specifically,
the relative share of labor and capital taxes, depend only on the relative long run factor supply elasticities
with respect to taxes, both of which are finite.24 The level of taxes that need to be financed in the long run,
which equals rB + G, is pinned down by the modified golden rule and the aggregate resource constraints.
By contrast, under complete markets, due to infinite long-run elasticity of savings, the former condition that
relates taxes is not well-defined.25 Absent any such restriction, figuring out the long-run debt and labor
income tax levels inevitably requires a complete transition analysis.
To further motivate this point, it is useful to consider some of the established results in the life-cycle lit-
erature. Erosa and Gervais (2002) show that initial conditions play no role in the determination of long-run
optimal fiscal policy, as long as there are no wealth transfers across generations. The relevance of their result
stems from the fact that Bewley-type models feature agents who have a sequence of finite planning hori-
zons of uncertain length, similar to overlapping-generations models, as described by Aiyagari (1994a) and
Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998). The long-run stationary distribution of the Bewley-type economy resembles
the cross-sectional distribution in a typical life-cycle model. The borrowing-constrained agents in the former
model act like the newborn generation in the latter model, who start their lives with assets a = −a.
The numerical procedure I use to compute the long-run optimal Ramsey policy illustrates how the prop-
erty of “irrelevance of the initial conditions” manifests itself at a technical level on the necessary conditions
for optimality. To make these ideas more concrete, next, I describe the major steps involved in the computa-
tion.
23An interesting case is one in which the agents are subject to the natural borrowing limit. In the current model, when long-run prices
are (r¯, w¯), this limit would be − y(e1,w¯)
r¯
where e1 is the lowest idiosyncratic shock realization. However, under the natural borrowing
limit, some of the crucial moments of the stationary distribution that appear in the first-order necessary conditions are not defined.
In particular, marginal utility u′(c) is not integrable with respect to the measure µ, and neither is u′(c) + u′′(c)[λ(1 + r¯) − λ′]. For
example, if u′(c) were integrable, integrating both sides of household’s Euler equation (which holds with equality almost surely) (25)
and cancelling out integrals, we would get β(1 + r¯) = 1, which cannot hold in the long run. Therefore, it is not clear whether the
Ramsey problem is well-defined for this case.
24Recently, in a very insightful contribution, Pikkety and Saez (2013) derived these elasticities in relatively closed-form. The elastici-
ties that appear in their formulas depend only on the long-run ergodic distribution, a point they do not emphasize.
25It is not well-defined in the sense that it prescribes a zero long run capital income tax rate without a corresponding restriction on
the labor income tax rate.
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3.2 Computing the Long-run Optimal Policies
To understand the numerical procedure, imagine for a moment that given some w¯ with 0 < N(w¯) < 1, the
government chooses the sequence {r¯t, Bt+1} optimally, subject to the constraint w¯t = w¯ for all t ≥ 0. Absent
wealth effects on labor supply decision, this restriction fixes the labor income process of the households over
time. Assume, in addition, that the optimal plan converges to an interior steady state with r¯ > 0, and strictly
positive aggregates C,K. It is easy to verify that there is at most one such steady state: Observe that I can
write the steady-state version of government budget constraint as
A = K +B =
F (K,N)− w¯N −G
r¯
Since modified golden rule and constant returns to scale property hold, KN is pinned down by the discount
rate β. Since aggregate labor supply depends only on w¯, given w¯ (and G), F (K,N)− w¯N −G is completely
determined. Therefore the right-hand side of the above expression is strictly decreasing in r¯ (for r¯ > 0). On
the supply side, for a fixed w¯, the aggregate steady-state private assets A is strictly increasing in r¯ without
bound.26 This implies that there is at most one r¯ that solves the above equation for any given w¯. Therefore,
in practice, I can compute steady-state values of all variables and associate them with the post-tax market
wage. I let r¯(w¯) denote the associated post-tax interest rate andm(a, e; w¯) denote the long-run distribution of
(a, e) for given prices (r¯(w¯), w¯). Up to this point, we also obtain the policy function for assets, a′ = g(a, e; w¯).
Can we find steady-state supporting multipliers (γ(w¯) and the policy function λ′(a, λ, e; w¯)) without ex-
plicitly accounting for the transition that led to this steady-state? It turns out the answer is positive. Using
a′ = g(a, e; w¯), and any given candidate γ, the functional equation (26) can be solved for λ′(a, λ, e; w¯). The
policy functions can then be used to compute the stationary joint distribution µ(a, λ, e; w¯). The relevant mo-
ments of the distribution are next used to pin down the value of γ using equation (27). Computational pro-
cedure explained in detail in the appendix exploits the fact that there is always a solution to these equations,
and that the induced joint process for (a, λ, e) admit an invariant distribution µ(a, λ, e; w¯). In other words,
due to ergodicity, the values of the additional state variables introduced to account for non-stationarity of
the problem can be recovered exclusively from the properties of the economy at the steady-state.
To find the complete solution to the Ramsey problem that involves the choice of optimal labor income
taxes (or post-tax rates w¯), we carry out this exercise for all w¯ and check whether the last necessary condition
we omitted up to this point, equation (28), is satisfied. In my quantitative analysis, for all parameter values
I used, there was a unique policy that satisfied the last necessary condition.
26One caveat is that even when w¯ is fixed, the relationship between r¯ and A might not be monotone due to potentially prevalent
wealth effects. On the other hand, in this class of models, it is very difficult to generate an example where this is the case. Not
surprisingly, for all my quantitative results, A(r¯) is monotonically increasing in r¯, given w¯.
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4 Model Specification and Calibration
The quantitative exercise involves the thought experiment of comparing the current system in the U.S. with
those that would be chosen by a Ramsey planner in the long run. Some of the key parameters in the model,
such as those related to the home-production technology, and the subjective discount rate, are identified
from the steady-state labor supply and savings choices of the households, who respond to the current tax
system optimally. The remaining parameters are either obtained from previous studies, or directly matched
to their counterparts in the data.
I use a CRRA-type utility function and a home-production function that induces a constant elasticity of
labor supply
u(c) =
c1−σ − 1
1− σ
H(1− n) = θ− 1γ 1− n
1+ 1γ
1 + 1γ
With this functional form, for an agent with efficiency e, labor supply satisfies
n(e, w¯) = θ(ew¯)γ (29)
at an interior solution, where γ > 0 represents the labor supply elasticity.
The production function is assumed to be of the Cobb-Douglas type:
F (K,N) = K1−αNα − δK
The stochastic process for labor efficiency et follows the AR(1) process
log(et+1) = const+ ρ log(et) +
√
σ2e(1− ρ2)t
where t ∼ N(0, 1).
The model period is assumed to be a year. I use δ = 0.08 for the depreciation rate and α = 0.64 for the
labor share in the production function, these are standard in the literature.
I use a coefficient of risk aversion of σ = 2 for the benchmark calibration and use a range of values σ ∈
[0.5, 4.0] for comparison. The quantitative results depend critically on the labor supply elasticity, therefore I
report results for a range of values γ ∈ [0.5, 2.0], using γ = 1.0 for the benchmark calibration. These different
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values capture a wide range of estimates provided in the literature. I assume that agents cannot borrow for
all quantitative results, i.e. a = 0.
Using PSID data for 1971-1992, Chang and Kim (2006) estimate an annual persistence of 0.818 and
standard deviation of 0.506 for log labor earnings process. Ignoring the possibility that the labor supply deci-
sion in the model attains a corner solution, in a stationary equilibrium, equation (29) predicts the following
relationship between labor earnings w¯etnt and labor efficiency units:
log(w¯etnt) = log(θw¯
1+γ) + (γ + 1) log(et)
Therefore, log labor efficiency and log earnings have the same persistence, and the standard deviation of
log labor efficiency satisfies σe = 0.5061+γ . For the benchmark calibration (where γ = 1), the PSID estimates and
the calculations jointly imply the underlying parameter values ρ = 0.818 and σe = 0.253. The constant term is
chosen such that E(e) = 1.0. I discretize this continuous process using 13 grid points {e1, . . . , e13} following
Tauchen (1986).27 As I vary labor supply elasticity γ for alternative parameterizations, I re-calibrate σe
accordingly.
I use a capital-to-market production ratio of K/Y = 3, which is a reasonable value for the U.S. economy.
Using the constant-returns-to-scale property of the production function, this value implies a pre-tax real
interest rate and wage level of r = 0.04 and w = 1.19 respectively.
Domeij and Heathcote (2004) report average tax rates in the U.S. to be around 39.7% for capital income
and 26.9% for labor income. Following these results, I assume a 40% capital tax rate, (τk = 0.40) which
implies a post-tax rate of r¯ = 0.024. I use a 27% labor tax rate, (τn = 0.27) which implies w¯ = 0.87. Given
w¯, I assign θ = 0.38 to match per-capita market hours equal to 1/3. Given the parameter values and labor
supplyN , other steady-state aggregates, in particular, capitalK, market production Y , and home-production
H are uniquely pinned down.
Government expenditure G = 0.13 is set such that at the initial steady state, it constitutes 20% of the
market production, the annual average in post-war U.S. data.
Given post-tax prices w¯, r¯, using the household’s problem, the discount rate uniquely determines the
steady-state demand for private assets A. Using the monotonicity of the asset demand function with respect
to discount rate, a value of β = 0.9762 is chosen such that the government budget constraint balances
at the steady state.28 The steady-state government debt level is then determined from B = A − K. For
27Continuity of the aggregate labor elasticity is critical in establishing existence of a solution to the Ramsey problem. With discretiza-
tion, even though N(w¯) is continuous throughout the entire range of w¯, N ′(w¯) exhibits jumps at points where certain types of agents
hit the n = 1 limit. This problem is overcome by increasing the number of grid points untilN ′(w¯) becomes continuous over the relevant
range for w¯.
28Comparative-statics analysis of this class of models is a challenging task, but some results are available in the recent literature.
Acemoglu and Jensen (2012) prove monotonicity of the supply of assets with respect to the discount rate.
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the benchmark calibration, steady-state debt level is about 87% of GDP.29 All parameter values used in the
benchmark calibration are summarized in table 1.
Table 1: Parameter Values-Benchmark Calibration
Parameters Value Target Moments/Source
Exogenously Calibrated Parameters
Coefficient of Risk Aversion (σ) 2.00
Labor Supply Elasticity (γ) 1.00
Labor Share in Production (α) 0.64
Depreciation Rate (δ) 0.08
Borrowing Constraint (a) 0.00
Persistence of Labor Productivity (ρ) 0.82 Chang and Kim (2006)
Standard Deviation of Labor Productivity (σe) 0.25 Chang and Kim (2006)
Labor income Tax Rate (τn) 0.27 Domeij and Heathcote (2004)
Capital income Tax Rate (τk) 0.40 Domeij and Heathcote (2004)
Jointly Calibrated Parameters
Labor Supply Constant (θ) 0.38 Market Hours=1/3
Discount Rate (β) 0.98 K/Y = 3.00
Government Expenditure (G) 0.13 G/Y = 0.20
In the next section, I present and discuss the results for the benchmark calibration as well as alternative
parameterizations of the model.
5 Results and Discussion of Findings
For all calibrations of the model, I numerically compute the optimal steady state using the methods discussed
in Section 3 and in more detail in the Appendix. To make a comparison with other steady states, I also solved
for all steady states that satisfy the modified golden rule over a grid-point of labor tax rates.30
5.1 Long-Run Optimal Fiscal Policy
Table 2 summarizes the long-run optimal tax rates. Not surprisingly, labor income tax rate is very sensitive
to labor supply elasticity. What is quite striking is that the magnitude of the labor tax rate is quite large
for all parameter values. Under benchmark calibration with γ = 1.0, labor tax rate is about 48%, about 21
percentage points higher than the observed average labor tax rates based on the figures reported by Domeij
29This figure is higher than the 60% average over the period 1990-2010 for the U.S. economy, and lower than the current level, which
is around 100%.
30As discussed in section 3, I can index all steady states by post-tax wage rate w¯. Since pre-tax wage is fixed for all steady states that
satisfy the modified golden rule, I can also use labor tax rate as an index.
20
and Heathcote (2004). Low labor elasticity (γ = 0.5) and high elasticity (γ = 2.0) cases generate long-run
labor tax rates of 65% and 31% respectively, both of which are above the U.S. average.
Table 2: Long-Run Optimal Steady-States
Variables γ = 1.0, σ = 2.0 γ = 0.5, σ = 2.0 γ = 2.0, σ = 2.0 γ = 1.0, σ = 1.0 γ = 1.0, σ = 4.0
Labor Tax Rate 48.02% 65.14% 31.47% 48.09% 47.94%
Capital Tax Rate 0.43% 0.12% 0.86% 0.21% 0.94%
Debt-to-GDP 2.78 7.06 -0.01 2.77 2.81
Market Hours 0.26 0.25 0.31 0.26 0.26
A very robust finding is that long-run optimal capital income tax rate is very low. Under benchmark
calibration, the capital tax rate is about 0.4%, much lower than the U.S. average of 40%. The corresponding
figures for low labor elasticity (γ = 0.5) and high elasticity (γ = 2.0) cases are 0.1% and 0.9% respectively.
It is obvious that labor elasticity and steady-state capital tax rate are positively related. In this model, high
elasticity of labor supply corresponds to a high labor income risk. Consequently, the precautionary savings
motive is more pronounced under high labor elasticity, leading to inefficiently high level of savings. The
Ramsey planner optimally responds to suppress these incentives by increasing capital taxes accordingly. As
intertemporal elasticity of substitution goes up from 0.25 to 1.00 (under benchmark labor supply elasticity of
γ = 1.0), the long-run optimal capital tax rate goes down from 0.9% to 0.2%, both of these rates are much
lower than the current U.S. average.
Under the benchmark calibration, the optimal debt-to-GDP ratio (more precisely, debt-to-market produc-
tion in this model) is about 2.78, much higher than the observed values in the U.S. Alternative parameteri-
zations yield values ranging from -0.01 (γ = 2.0 and σ = 2.0) to 7.06 (γ = 0.5 and σ = 2.0). Figures 1 and 2
exhibit long-run optimal tax rates and debt-to-GDP ratios for the entire range of labor supply elasticities and
intertemporal elasticities of substitution.
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Figure 1: Long-run Optimal Taxes and Debt-to-GDP Ratio for a range of labor supply elasticities.
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Figure 2: Long-Run Optimal Capital Tax and Debt-to-GDP Ratio for a range of intertemporal elasticities of
substitution.
To get a better sense of why the model delivers quite extreme values, I can compare the optimal steady
state to all other steady states that satisfy the modified golden rule property. Figures 3-7 summarize all
numerical findings. For all figures, the dashed vertical line marks the labor income tax rate for the optimal
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steady state.31
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Figure 3: Long-Run Optimal Tax Rates and Welfare for Benchmark Calibration
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Figure 4: Long-Run Optimal Government Debt and Average Labor Share of After-tax Income for Benchmark
Calibration
31Aiyagari (1994a) carried out a similar exercise and constructed a locus of steady-state values as in these figures. He interpreted
each of these points as a potential long-run optimal steady state for some initial condition. In one parameterization of his model, he
found the U.S. capital and labor income tax rate combination to be on the locus of steady states, and argued that one cannot dismiss
the possibility that currently observed levels are long-run optimal. In light of my findings, this interpretation is clearly not correct.
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Figure 5: Long-Run Optimal Capital Stock and Hours for Benchmark Calibration
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Figure 6: Long-Run Per-Capita Consumption and Consumption Inequality for Benchmark Calibration
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Figure 7: Long-Run Income and Wealth Inequality for Benchmark Calibration
Figure 4 gives us a clear picture of what the government would like to achieve in the long run. First,
the level of government debt is maximized at the optimal steady state, conditional on satisfying the modified
golden rule. Given an exogenous level of government spending, this is equivalent to attaining the peak of
the Laffer curve, since steady-state tax revenue must equal rB +G. With the given parameter values, there
is a unique such point. Second, the average labor share of after-tax income is close to being minimized.32
To gain some more insight on these incentives of the planner, we can look at the steady-state version of the
budget constraint of a typical household. Defining k ≡ a − B, adding and subtracting relevant terms to
equation (19), I obtain the following equivalent formulation at the steady state:
c+ k′ ≤ k(1 + r¯) + y(e, w¯) + r¯B
k′ ≥ −B
Issuing debt which is financed through labor income taxes plays a dual role. First, the borrowing con-
straints are effectively relaxed, an observation made very early on in the literature.33 Second, the households
32Average labor share of after-tax income is calculated as follows:
ALS(w¯) =
∫
y(e, w¯)
r¯(w¯)a+ y(e, w¯)
µ(ds; w¯)
where µ(.; w¯) is the steady-state distribution and r¯(w¯) is the post-tax interest rate that clears all markets, satisfying the modified golden
rule when the post-tax wage level is w¯.
33This argument is exact when the government has access to lump-sum taxes, i.e. a marginal increase in debt is observationally
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are exposed to less risk since the riskless part of income goes up through the r¯B term and the risky compo-
nent y(e, w¯) goes down through taxes on labor income. The government can neither absorb all the risk, nor
relax the borrowing constraints all the way by issuing debt excessively, because tax revenues are bounded
in this model. The efficient level of debt should induce optimal smoothing of tax burden over time which
implies the modified golden rule property holds in the long run.
Motivated purely by the prediction that agents save “too much” in this model vis-á-vis the complete
markets benchmark, one would expect the government to tax capital somewhat heavily depending on the
degree of market incompleteness. It is clear, however, that the scope of intervention through capital taxes
remains fairly limited quantitatively. Instead, the results point to the direction that the government provides
the necessary adjustment by suppressing the source of the problem, rather than correcting its consequences.
This is achieved by (i) alleviating the labor income risk through reduction of labor share of income, and (ii)
effectively relaxing borrowing constraints by issuing debt. The quantitatively small capital income tax also
suggests that the Chamley-Judd zero-capital-tax result is not too far from optimal even under incomplete
markets.
The features of the long-run fiscal policy are independent of whether the government needs to finance ex-
penditures, supporting the premise that inefficiencies induced by incomplete markets drive the main results.
Figures 8 and 9 represent an economy with G = 0; the same qualitative features are apparent.
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Figure 8: Long-Run Tax Rates and Welfare for Benchmark Calibration
equivalent to a marginal relaxation of borrowing constraints. In this model, all taxes are distortionary, therefore this is only suggestive.
26
0 20 40 60 80
3
4
5
6
Labor Tax Rate %
G
ov
t. 
De
bt
 (B
)
0 20 40 60 80
0.88
0.9
0.92
Labor Tax Rate %La
bo
r S
ha
re
 o
f I
nc
om
e
Figure 9: Long-Run Government Debt and Average Labor Share of Income for Benchmark Calibration
Figures 10 and 11 clearly demonstrate that the qualitative results discussed above for the benchmark
calibration are robust to different values for labor elasticity. In all cases, the optimal steady state satisfies
maximum debt and close to minimum labor share of income.
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Figure 10: Long-Run Government Debt and Average Labor Share of Income for γ = 0.5, σ = 2.0
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Figure 11: Long-Run Government Debt and Average Labor Share of Income for γ = 2.0, σ = 2.0
5.2 Welfare and Inequality in the Long Run
Figure 3 illustrates a very striking fact about the steady-state welfare level. The steady state which is reached
following an optimal plan delivers a (flow) welfare level that is significantly lower than those that could be
achieved using alternative tax rates.34 This is also clear from the levels of per-capita consumption in Figure
6. Indeed, if we were inclined to accept the view that the steady state that maximizes flow welfare is close
to being long-run optimal, we would be led to prescribe a labor income tax rate of 9%, a capital income tax
rate of 38% and a negative government debt that is 306% of GDP! This observation makes it clear that the
results provided in the quantitative literature that relies exclusively on maximizing the steady-state welfare
are potentially misleading.35
Figures 12 and 13 demonstrate the flow welfare levels for low and high labor supply elasticity cases.
Welfare levels share the same comparative features with the benchmark calibration.
34I calculate steady-state welfare in utility terms as
Welfare(w¯) =
∫
u(c)µ(ds; w¯)
where µ(.; w¯) is the steady-state distribution when the post-tax wage level is w¯.
35Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998) finds positive debt level to be optimal by carrying out a steady-state welfare maximization. However
the government in their model has access to lump-sum taxes/transfers, and the authors do not limit the attention to the steady states
that satisfy modified golden rule property. In this sense, these seemingly conflicting results are not comparable.
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Figure 12: Long-Run Tax Rates and Welfare for γ = 0.5, σ = 2.0
10 20 30 40 50
2
4
6
8
Labor Tax Rate %
Ca
pi
ta
l T
ax
 R
at
e 
%
10 20 30 40 50
6
8
10
Labor Tax Rate %
W
el
fa
re
Figure 13: Long-Run Tax Rates and Welfare for γ = 2.0, σ = 2.0
The model economy features non-market production as an alternative activity, therefore, to facilitate
comparison with the data, I use taxable market income Gini coefficient as a measure of income inequality.36
Figures 6 and 7 exhibit consumption, income and wealth inequalities across all steady states that fea-
36Market income Gini coefficient measures the inequality in ra+ wn(e, w¯)e.
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ture the modified golden rule property. All long-run optimal inequality measures are slightly lower than
the model-generated numbers for the U.S. economy. The long-run optimal income Gini, wealth Gini, and
consumption Gini coefficients are 0.550, 0.495, and 0.030 respectively. The corresponding model-generated
numbers for the U.S. economy (initial steady state) are 0.476, 0.618, and 0.053.37
6 Transitional Dynamics
The steady-state analysis sheds light on the incentives of the Ramsey planner in the long run but it is com-
pletely silent on the magnitude and the source of welfare gains from following an optimal plan. Since initial
conditions play no role in determining the long-run optimal fiscal policy, providing a complete solution to
the Ramsey problem, i.e. characterizing the optimal transition path from any given initial condition, is left
for future research. On the other hand, it is essential that we get some insight on the way in which an
optimal plan improves welfare, especially given the result that the Ramsey planner is far from maximizing
flow welfare in the long run.
This controversial finding naturally begs the following hypothetical question: If the status quo in the
economy features fiscal policy that provides the highest achievable flow welfare level, why would the Ramsey
planner propose a reform that provides a significantly lower flow welfare in the long run? Provided that there
is convergence to the steady state, there is only one possibility: The welfare gains over the transition are
large enough to compensate for the losses in the long run.
It turns out it is straightforward to construct feasible, but not necessarily optimal, fiscal policy paths,
where there are overall welfare gains moving from the steady state with the highest flow welfare to the
optimal steady state. In all of these examples, government achieves a welfare improvement by front-loading
consumption and/or by reducing consumption inequality significantly over the transition path. This reform
necessitates a significant increase in debt over the transition.
To keep things simple, for the numerical results, I constrain the transition paths to feature an initial
jump in the post-tax wage to w¯0, followed by a linear transition to the long-run optimal level for T = 300
periods. I also assume that the government cannot confiscate assets by imposing the constraint that r¯t ≥ 0.
The government then optimally imposes a 100% capital income tax in period 0, that is, r¯0 = 0. Following
another jump in period 1 to a given r¯1, r¯t converges linearly to the long-run optimal level, just like the
sequence w¯t. Using the optimal savings and consumption responses of the households that follow the tax
reform announced in period 0, I compute per-capita consumption and private assets over the transition. I use
these levels to back out aggregate capital and government debt using the government resource constraint.
37Diaz-Gimenez, Glover, and Rios-Rull (2011) report income and wealth Gini of 0.58 and 0.82 using SCF data.
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With all these restrictions in place, given a value for r¯1, w¯0 is pinned down by the initial conditions of the
economy. Therefore, in this constrained transition analysis, the only free choice variable is r¯1.
Figures 14 and 15 represent such a transition, where the economy starts from the steady state that
features the highest welfare under the benchmark calibration. In all figures, the horizontal dashed line
represents the initial steady-state values for comparison. In this particular example, fiscal policy reform
effectively features a net income transfer initially, since both r¯ and w¯ go up significantly after period 1. After
an initial decline in consumption level due to 100% tax on capital income in period 0, a dominant income
effect leads to a gradual increase in consumption which surpasses the pre-reform level after a few periods.
Consumption level starts declining around period 35, as w¯ goes below the pre-reform level, and eventually
converges to the long-run optimal level. Due to discounting, the initial increase in consumption that lasts for
about 70 periods offsets, at least in part, the large decline in the long run.
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Figure 14: Change in Fiscal Policy over Transition
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Figure 15: Change in Consumption and Consumption Gini Coefficient over Transition
A significant second source of welfare gains in this reform comes from the decline in consumption in-
equality. Since r¯ is significantly higher than the pre-reform level, the households respond by increasing their
holdings of assets. This leads to a large decline in labor share of income for all households, leading to lower
income risk. As the severity of market incompleteness diminishes through this channel, households enjoy
more consistent consumption levels, both over the transition, and in the long run. Naturally, this shows
up in the cross-section through a low Gini coefficient. Figure 15 exhibits that consumption Gini goes down
permanently in period 0 and stays lower than the pre-reform level throughout the entire transition.
7 Literature Review and Further Discussion
This research is closely related to the branch of literature that emphasizes the importance of the transition
path for long-run policy. An optimal fiscal policy analysis with a long-run welfare objective, in general, will
have very different implications compared to one that takes into account the transitional effects, as illustrated
in section 6. With this shortcoming in mind, Domeij and Heathcote (2004) rank alternative fiscal policies
by quantifying welfare gains or losses associated with the transition to a steady state.38 However, they
restrict taxes to be constant over the transition path. While this is a clear improvement over any approach
that relies on a steady-state welfare evaluation, their analysis does not provide a direct comparison with the
38See Krueger and Ludwig (2013) for a more recent application of the same approach.
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complete markets benchmark presented by Chamley (1986). By contrast, this paper is meant to provide such
a comparison, since the policy tools available to the government are identical and not restricted over time.
Bakis, Kaymak, and Poschke (2014), in their study of optimal progressivity of income taxes, take a similar
approach and report quantitative results that support the message that “transition does matter”. In their
analysis of optimal progressivity of taxes, they show that a social planner who maximizes the steady-state
welfare would choose a regressive tax scheme, whereas a constrained transition analysis yields a progressive
tax scheme instead.
From a quantitative perspective, it is also important to note that Domeij and Heathcote (2004) find, using
a calibrated version of their model with labor income risk, that eliminating the currently high capital income
taxes in the U.S. leads to a significant welfare loss, if the proposed reform is a one time permanent change.
I would like to point out that the main findings in section 5, although prima facie inconsistent with those by
Domeij and Heathcote (2004), should not be subject to a direct comparison. In particular, the quantitative
exercise by Domeij and Heathcote (2004) is fundamentally different in the sense that their findings do not
dismiss the possibility of existence of a time-varying path of fiscal policy variables that eventually lead to very
small capital income tax rates. This is even more evident when we focus on the tax reform implications in a
complete markets economy and ask the following question: “What is the optimal capital income tax rate in a
complete markets economy if the proposed fiscal policy reform is a one time permanent change à la Domeij
and Heathcote (2004)?”. This policy exercise is largely ignored in the literature since Chamley (1986)
provided sharp analytical characterizations for the unrestricted case, but Chari and Kehoe (1999) pointed
out that optimal capital income tax is strictly positive when such a restriction is imposed. The intuition is
that when these restrictions are not in place, it is optimal to front-load all capital income taxes making them
initially large and positive, and eventually setting them to zero. When capital income taxes are restricted to
be constant over time, a positive capital tax rate balances these opposing effects. Since the number of periods
in which capital income taxes remain high depends on the initial conditions, the optimal capital income tax
rate under the restricted policy reform is a function of initial conditions. Given these theoretical results for
the complete markets economies, and in light of the quantitative results in Domeij and Heathcote (2004),
the natural conjecture would be that the optimal time-varying fiscal policy for the U.S. calls for large and
positive capital income taxes for a significant number of periods before it converges to the very low levels
found in section 5. The verification of this claim requires a complete transition analysis.
Gottardi, Kajii, and Nakajima (2011) provide a complete characterization of the optimal dynamic fiscal
policy under incomplete markets in a highly stylized model of human-capital accumulation. Sacrificing the
generality of the problem in favor of a complete solution, their approach allows for elegant closed-form
solutions. By contrast, this paper answers quantitative questions within the confines of a workhorse model
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used in the study of heterogeneity in macroeconomics, keeping the environment as general as possible.
This paper is also related to the recent literature on constrained efficiency. It is well known that an
equilibrium allocation in a model with incomplete financial markets can be improved on, since welfare
theorems do not hold in this environment. Therefore, fiscal policy has a role that goes beyond the need to
finance government spending. The widespread view that saving is inefficiently high in Bewley-type models
was recently challenged. Gottardi, Kajii, and Nakajima (2013) draw a striking conclusion based on their
constrained inefficiency analysis: whether capital income should be taxed or not has nothing to do with
agents saving “too much” relative to a complete markets economy.
For a reasonably calibrated incomplete markets model, Davila et al. (2012) find that the capital stock is
too low in the U.S. economy from a constrained efficiency perspective, and it ought to be higher, a result that
crucially depends on the income composition of the consumption-poor. A higher capital stock leads to an
increase in marginal product of labor. If the consumption-poor have labor-intensive income, this change, in
fact, leads to an improvement in an egalitarian sense, since consumption-poor have de facto higher Pareto
weights. As a consequence, their decentralization exercise prescribes an optimal fiscal policy that involves a
capital income subsidy.
On close inspection, we can point out three reasons why the long-run optimal policy in the model outlined
in this paper leads to a completely different outcome: First, the notion of constrained efficiency in Davila
et al. (2012) necessitates that all proceeds from taxes be rebated back to the households. There are no
explicit transfers between households. Therefore, the improvement in their economy has to come from price
effects. Second, due to the specific structure of their model, the planner cannot smooth tax distortions
over time, whereas the government in this model can issue debt, allowing the planner to achieve dynamic
efficiency.39 Third, labor supply is inelastic in Davila et al. (2012). Although “capital intensity ought to be
higher in the U.S.” is a common finding, in the current model, the government achieves this goal by lowering
labor supply through labor income taxes. By contrast, the only way it can be achieved in Davila et al. (2012)
is through a capital subsidy.
An important and somewhat confusing distinction between the analysis by Davila et al. (2012) and
Aiyagari (1994a, 1995) (and this paper) is that the former argues that whether capital income should be
taxed or subsidized is a quantitative question, whereas the latter argues that optimal capital income tax rate
is always positive, regardless of the calibration of the model. I would like to point out that Aiyagari’s (1995)
positive capital tax result hinges on the assumption that the government can issue debt. Whether or not the
government can issue debt, β(1 + r¯) < 1 holds in the long run for an economy with heterogeneous agents
39Dynamic efficiency only in the sense of achieving the first-best capital intensity. This should not be confused with the notion of
dynamic inefficiency that is standard in the overlapping-generations literature.
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and incomplete markets. However, when the government has access to debt, socially efficient intertemporal
allocation of tax burden necessitates that the level of capital intensity K/N satisfies modified golden rule
in the long run. Absent government debt, the rate at which the tax burden is transferred across periods is
irrelevant for the planner, and there is no reason to expect a priori that the modified golden rule holds. It
is reasonable to conjecture that a model without debt delivers either r¯ < FK or r¯ > FK , depending on the
parameterization. In this paper, due to its normative appeal, I only provide a quantitative analysis of the
model with debt.
Aiyagari’s (1995) intuition for positive capital income tax rate was that the households in a Bewley
economy save “too much” vis-á-vis the complete markets benchmark. However, as pointed out by Davila
et al. (2012) and Gottardi, Kajii, and Nakajima (2013), as long as the planner does not have the policy tools
to “complete” the financial markets, there is no good reason why one should take the complete markets
benchmark as a point of reference. Indeed, the positive capital income tax result is most likely an artifact of
the availability of debt as an instrument for the planner.
8 Conclusion
Quantitative analysis of optimal dynamic fiscal policy is a difficult task since the problem is time-inconsistent
and non-stationary. The main contribution of this paper is to reveal that this problem is much easier to solve
than previously thought in Bewley-type models with idiosyncratic income risk and incomplete markets. As
illustrated, the dependence of long-run optimal fiscal policy on the initial conditions disappears asymptoti-
cally in this environment, much like life-cycle models in which there are no private wealth transfers across
generations. This leads to a long-run optimal policy that depends only on the “deep parameters” of the
model and the underlying income process. The emphasis in this paper was on the quantitative implications.
Since this property is likely to hold in a broader class of optimal fiscal policy problems, a theoretical study of
minimal modeling assumptions that deliver this property is a promising next step.
Although a constrained transition analysis is provided in this paper, for the sake of preserving a unified
theme, the study of optimal transition path is left out for future research. However, as pointed out earlier,
a complete solution to the Ramsey problem is necessary to fully understand the source of welfare gains
from a fiscal policy reform. The recursive version of the Ramsey problem introduced in Section 2 can be
conveniently used for this task. The real challenge, however, comes from the dimensionality of the state
variable. An adaptation of the the “approximate aggregation” method of Krusell and Smith (1998) might
render this analysis feasible.
The quantitative results in this paper provide a striking counter to the claims in the literature in favor
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of high capital taxation when markets are incomplete. In this widely-used framework for analyzing optimal
capital taxation, this paper shows that a high level of debt that is financed by taxes on the source of income
that is stochastic could improve efficiency by suppressing the consequences of missing financial markets.
Moreover, distortionary capital income tax is largely redundant once such a public debt management is
implemented. A detailed policy recommendation for the U.S. economy requires further research on the
robustness of these results with respect to alternative tax instruments and different specifications of the
income process. The quantitative methods used in this paper can be adapted in a straightforward manner
to models that feature tax instruments that resemble the U.S. tax code more closely. For instance, a study of
optimal progressivity of income taxes is a promising extension of this kind.
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A Technical Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proposition 1 An interior solution to the Ramsey problem satisfies the following conditions:
λ′ = h(.) : u′(c) ≥ β(1 + r¯′)E[u′(c′)|e] with equality if a′ > −a, a.e. µ (30)
a′ = g(.) : u′(c) + u′′(c)
[
λ(1 + r¯)− λ′] = β(1 + r¯′)E[u′(c′) + u′′(c′)[λ′(1 + r¯′)− λ′′]|e] (31)
+ βγ′(FK(K ′, N ′)− r¯′) if a′ > −a, otherwise λ′ = 0, a.e. µ
B′(µ,B) : γ = β(1 + FK(K ′, N ′))γ′ (32)
r¯(µ,B) : γA =
∑
e
∫
u′(c)λµ(ds, e)+
∑
e
∫
a
(
u′(c) + u′′(c)
[
λ(1 + r¯)− λ′])µ(ds, e) (33)
w¯(µ,B) : γN = γ(FN (K,N)− w¯)N ′(w¯) +
∑
e
∫
en(e, w¯)
(
u′(c) + u′′(c)
[
λ(1 + r¯)− λ′])µ(ds, e) (34)
Proof.
Let y(e, w¯) = maxn w¯en+H(1−n) be the total labor income of a household with state e and let n(e, w¯) =
argmaxn∈[0,1] w¯en + H(1 − n). Applying envelope theorem, I have y′(e, w¯) = n(e, w¯)e. I can then write the
aggregate labor supply as a function of w¯ only: N(w¯) =
∑
e
∫
en(e, w¯)µ(ds, e) =
∑
e
∫
y′(e, w¯)µ(ds, e).
I assume further that the sequential formulation of the Ramsey problem admits a stationary solution
so that the policy functions a′ = g(µ,B, s, e) and λ′ = h(µ,B, s, e) are well-defined. Also define η′ =
η∗(µ,B, s, e) and θ′ = θ∗(µ,B, s, e) to represent the optimal solution for the multipliers. By definition,
h(.) = η∗(.)(g(.) + a)− θ∗(.) holds.
Exploiting the induced Markov structure, it is straightforward to show that the sequential problem (17)
is equivalent to the following problem:
min
η∗t+1,θ
∗
t+1≥0
max
r¯t,w¯t,Bt+1,gt+1≥−a
∞∑
t=0
βt
∑
e
∫ [
u(ct)+u
′(ct)
[
λ(1+r¯t(µt, Bt))−ht+1(µt, Bt, s, e)
]]
µt(ds, e) (35)
subject to
Gt + (1 + r¯t(µt, Bt))Bt + r¯t(µt, Bt)Kt + w¯t(µt, Bt)N(w¯t(µt, Bt)) ≤ F (Kt, N(w¯t(µt, Bt))) +Bt+1(µt, Bt)
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ht+1(µt, Bt, s, e) ≡ η∗t+1(.)(gt+1(.) + a)− θ∗t+1(.)
where
ct = a(1 + r¯t(µt, Bt)) + y(e, w¯t(µt, Bt))− gt+1(µt, Bt, s, e)
Kt =
∑
e
∫
aµt(ds, e)−Bt
µt+1(S
′, e′) =
∑
e
piee′
∫
I[(gt+1(.), ht+1(.)) ∈ S′]µt(ds, e) for each S′ ∈ Σs, each e′ ∈ E (36)
given a0, B0.
Let βtγt(µt, Bt) represent the Lagrange multiplier for the government budget constraint at period t. By
taking the derivative of the function (35) with respect to Bt+1, r¯t and w¯t, I obtain the last three necessary
conditions (32), (33), (34).
γt = βγt+1(1 + FK(Kt+1, Nt+1))
γt(Kt +Bt) = γtAt =
∑
e
∫
u′(ct)λµt(ds, e) +
∑
e
∫
a
(
u′(ct) + u′′(ct)
[
λ(1 + r¯t)− ht+1
])
µt(ds, e)
γtNt = γt(FN (Kt, Nt)− w¯t)N ′t(w¯t) +
∑
e
∫
en(e, w¯t)
(
u′(ct) + u′′(ct)
[
λ(1 + r¯t)− ht+1
])
µt(ds, e)
For what is to follow, I use calculus of variations to prove the first-order condition (31). Consider the part
of the objective function and government budget constraints that correspond to two subsequent periods.
For clarity of exposition, I eliminate time subscripts. Given the optimal policies for next period, a′′,λ′′,
optimal fiscal policy variables r¯, r¯′, w¯, w¯′, B,B′, and the government multipliers γ, γ′, the optimal policies
g(µ,B, s, e), η∗(µ,B, s, e) and θ∗(µ,B, s, e) would solve the following saddle-point problem:
min
η′,θ′≥0
max
a′≥−a
∑
e
∫
u(a(1 + r¯) + y(e, w¯)− a′) + u′(a(1 + r¯) + y(e, w¯)− a′)(λ(1 + r¯)− η′(a′ + a) + θ′)µ(ds, e)
+ γ
[
F (K,N) +B′ −G− (1 + r¯)B − r¯K − w¯N
]
+β
∑
e′
∫
u(a′(1 + r¯′) + y(e′, w¯′)− a′′) + u′(a′(1 + r¯′) + y(e′, w¯′)− a′′)((η′(a′ + a)− θ′)(1 + r¯′)− λ′′)µ′(ds′, e′)
+ βγ′
[
F (K ′, N ′) +B′′ −G′ − (1 + r¯′)B′ − r¯′K ′ − w¯′N ′
]
where µ′(ds′, e′) = µt+1(ds′, e′) is given by (36) and
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K =
∑
e
∫
aµ(ds, e) K ′ =
∑∫
a′µ′(ds′, e′)
Using the transition function induced by (36) and applying Theorem 8.3 (pg. 216) in Stokey, Lucas, and
Prescott (1989), I express the above expression in a single integral:
∑
e
∫ [
u
[
a(1 + r¯) + y(e, w¯)− g(.)]+ u′[a(1 + r¯) + y(e, w¯)− g(.)](λ(1 + r¯)− h(.)) + φ∗(.)[g(.) + a]
β
∑
e′
piee′u
[
g(.)(1 + r¯′) + y(e′, w¯′)− a′′]+ u′[g(.)(1 + r¯′) + y(e′, w¯′)− a′′](h(.)(1 + r¯′)− λ′′)]µ(ds, e)
+ γ
[
F (K,N) +B′ −G− (1 + r¯)B − r¯K − w¯N
]
+ βγ′
[
F (K ′, N ′) +B′′ −G′ − (1 + r¯′)B′ − r¯′K ′ − w¯′N ′
]
where
K =
∑
e
∫
aµ(ds, e) K ′ =
∑
e
∫
g(µ,B, s, e)µ(ds, e)
h(.) = η∗(.)(g(.) + a)− θ∗(.)
and φ(µ, a, λ, e) denotes the Lagrange multiplier for the constraint g(µ, a, λ, e) + a ≥ 0.
For ease of exposition, I assume that measure µ admits densitym(a, λ, e) so that
∑
e
∫
m(a, λ, e)dadλ = 1;
this assumption is not necessary for the result.
For a fixed efficiency e0 and λ0, let g(µ, a, λ, e) = g(µ, a, λ, e)+I[e = e0, λ = λ0]δg(a) be an −perturbation
of the policy function for assets at (λ0, e0) with an arbitrary measurable function δg(a). For the policy func-
tion to be optimal, g(µ, a, λ, e) must be suboptimal for any  > 0. Define the perturbed objective
κ() =
∑
e
∫ [
u
[
a(1 + r¯) + y(e, w¯)− g(.)]+ u′[a(1 + r¯) + y(e, w¯)− g(.)](λ(1 + r¯)− h(.)) + φ∗(.)[g(.) + a]
β
∑
e′
piee′u
[
g(.)(1 + r¯′) + y(e′, w¯′)− a′′]+ u′[g(.)(1 + r¯′) + y(e′, w¯′)− a′′](h(.)(1 + r¯′)− λ′′)]m(a, λ, e)dadλ
+ γ
[
F (K,N) +B′ −G− (1 + r¯)B − r¯K − w¯N
]
+ βγ′
[
F (K ′, N ′) +B′′ −G′ − (1 + r¯′)B′ − r¯′K ′ − w¯′N ′
]
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where K ′ =
∑
e
∫
g(.)m(a, λ, e)dadλ and
h(.) = η∗(.)(g(.) + a)− θ∗(.).
Taking the derivative of κ() and evaluating at  = 0 should equal 0, since policy function is optimal.
κ′(0) =
∫ [
φ∗(.)−
(
u′(c) + u′′(c)(λ0(1 + r¯)− h(.))
)
+ β(1 + r¯′)
∑
e′
pie0e′
(
u′(c′) + u′′(c′)(h(.)(1 + r¯)− λ′′)
)
− η∗(.)
(
u′(c)− β(1 + r¯)
∑
e′
pie0e′u
′(c′)
)]
δg(a)m(a, λ0, e0)da
+ βγ′
[
(FK(K
′, N ′)− r¯)
∫
δg(a˜)m(a˜, λ0, e0)da˜
]
= 0
Since this is true for an arbitrary function δg(a), let δg(a) = I[a ≥ a0] for some a0. Substituting this
function, I get
∫ ∞
a0
[
φ∗(.)−
(
u′(c) + u′′(c)(λ0(1 + r¯)− h(.))
)
+ β(1 + r¯′)
∑
e′
pie0e′
(
u′(c′) + u′′(c′)(h(.)(1 + r¯)− λ′′)
)
− η∗(.)
(
u′(c)− β(1 + r¯)
∑
e′
pie0e′u
′(c′)
)]
m(a, λ0, e0)da
+ βγ′
[
(FK(K
′, N ′)− r¯)
∫ ∞
a0
m(a˜, λ0, e0)da˜
]
= 0
I picked a0 arbitrarily, therefore the above expression is identically zero for all a0. Taking the derivative
with respect to a0, I get
φ∗(.)− (u′(c) + u′′(c)(λ0(1 + r¯)− h(.)))− η∗(.)
(
u′(c)− β(1 + r¯)
∑
e′
pie0e′u
′(c′)
)
+ β(1 + r¯′)
∑
e′
pie0e′
(
u′(c′) + u′′(c′)(h(.)(1 + r¯′)− λ′′))+ βγ′(FK(K ′, N ′)− r¯′) = 0
Therefore for all (a, λ, e), it must be the case that
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φ∗(.)− (u′(c) + u′′(c)(λ(1 + r¯)− h(.)))− η∗(.)
(
u′(c)− β(1 + r¯)
∑
e′
piee′u
′(c′)
)
(37)
+ β(1 + r¯′)
∑
e′
piee′
(
u′(c′) + u′′(c′)(h(.)(1 + r¯′)− λ′′))+ βγ′(FK(K ′, N ′)− r¯′) = 0
Following the identical steps above, but for the policy functions η∗(.), θ∗(.) and φ∗(.), I obtain the fol-
lowing conditions. Not surprisingly, these are the necessary and sufficiency conditions for optimality for an
individual household facing a given sequence of prices.
(g(.) + a)
(
u′(c)− β(1 + r¯)
∑
e′
piee′u
′(c′)
)
≤ 0 with equality if η∗(.) > 0 (38)
u′(c)− β(1 + r¯)
∑
e′
piee′u
′(c′) ≥ 0 with equality if θ∗(.) > 0 (39)
g(.) + a ≥ 0 with equality if φ∗(.) > 0 (40)
Case 1: g(.) + a > 0.
When asset choice is interior, conditions (38) and (39) jointly imply the functional Euler equation (39)
holds with equality. The necessary condition (30) in the proposition follows immediately. In addition, since
φ∗(.) = 0 due to condition (40), (37) simplifies to
−(u′(c)+u′′(c)(λ(1+r¯)−h(.)))+β(1+r¯′)
∑
e′
piee′
(
u′(c′)+u′′(c′)(h(.)(1+r¯′)−λ′′))+βγ′(FK(K ′, N ′)−r¯′) = 0
This is identical to equation (31) in the proposition. This completes the proof for the case in which g(.)+a >
0.
Case 2: g(.) + a = 0.
When borrowing constraint is binding, conditions (38) and (39) jointly imply u′(c) ≥ β(1+r¯)∑e′ piee′u′(c′)
and θ∗(.) = 0. Since η∗(g(.) + a) = 0, we must have
λ∗(.) = η∗(.)[g(.) + a]− θ∗(.) = 0
These are identical to the conditions in (30) and (31) in the proposition for the case in which borrowing
constraint binds.
Q.E.D.
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B Computational Appendix
B.1 Computing the Optimal Steady States
B.1.1 Policy Functions
As described in the main text, using standard techniques described in Aiyagari (1994b), for any given w¯, I
can solve for r¯(w¯) that clears all markets and satisfies the modified golden rule. This provides the policy
functions c(a, e; w¯) and a′(a, e; w¯) along with the long-run stationary distribution m(a, e; w¯).
For ease of exposition, for the entire numerical exercise I will use an auxilary variable q ≡ λ/γ and
eliminate λ from the system. In particular, all policy functions and the steady-state distribution will be
defined over (a, q, e) space instead.
Using the fact that the K/N ratio satisfies the modified golden rule property, I can write β(FK − r¯) =
1− β(1 + r¯). Using this result and dividing (26) by Lagrange multiplier γ, I obtain
u′′(c)[q(1 + r¯)− q′] = β(1 + r¯)E
[
u′′(c′)[q′(1 + r¯)− q′′]|e
]
+ 1− β(1 + r¯) (41)
Since γ > 0 at the steady state, q = 0 if and only if λ = 0.
Since equation (41) is linear in q, I conjecture that the policy function for q′ is also linear in q.
q′(a, q, e; w¯) = α0(a, e; w¯)q +
α1(a, e; w¯)
(1 + r¯)u′′(c)
(42)
where α0(a, e; w¯) and α1(a, e; w¯) are potentially non-linear functions in (a, e).
Substituting this functional form into (41), I get the following expression at a steady state:
u′′(c)
[
q(1+r¯−α0)− α1
(1 + r¯)u′′(c)
]
= β(1+r¯)E
[
u′′(c′)
[
(1+r¯−α′0)(α0q+
α1
(1 + r¯)u′′(c)
)− α
′
1
(1 + r¯)u′′(c′)
]|e]+1−β(1+r¯)
where α0 = α0(a, e; w¯), α1 = α1(a, e; w¯), α′0 = α0(a
′, e′; w¯), α′1 = α1(a
′, e′; w¯). For the states in which
a′(a, e) = −a, α0 = α1 = 0.
Equating the coefficients of q on each side of this equality, I obtain the following functional equation for
α0(a, e; w¯).
u′′(c)(1 + r¯ − α0) = α0β(1 + r¯)E
[
u′′(c′)(1 + r¯ − α′0)|e
]
(43)
Similarly, equating the constants on both sides of the equation, I obtain a functional equation in α1.
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− α1
1 + r¯
=
α1
u′′(c)
βE
[
u′′(c′)(1 + r¯ − α′0)|e
]
− βE(α′1|e) + 1− β(1 + r¯) (44)
Next, I solve for βE
[
u′′(c′)(1 + r¯ − α′0)|e
]
in equation (43) and substitute into equation (44) to get
α1 = α0
[
βE(α′1|e)− [1− β(1 + r¯)]
]
(45)
Using (43), define the mapping
T0α0 =

u′′(c)(1+r¯)
u′′(c)+β(1+r¯)E
[
u′′(c)(1+r¯−α′0)
] : a′(a, e) > −a
0 : a′(a, e) = −a
Mapping T0 satisfies monotonicity but does not satisfy discounting unless I impose strict assumptions on
the domain. Therefore, contraction mapping theorem might not apply. It can be shown analytically that
the derivative of the policy function a′(a, e; w¯) solves the functional equation (43).40 Since policy function
is continuous and monotone, the derivative exists almost everywhere in (−a,∞).41 (See Carroll (2012) for
an extensive discussion and characterization of points at which the derivative does not exist.) I verified
quantitatively that starting from any initial function, iterating on α0 converged to the numerical derivative
of a′(a, e; w¯).
Suppose α∗0(a, e; w¯), solves (43). Define the functional mapping
T1α1 =
 α
∗
0[βE(α′1|e)− (1− β(1 + r¯))] : a′(a, e) > −a
0 : a′(a, e) = −a
Provided that the sufficiency condition supα∗0 <
1
β holds, it is easy to show that mapping T1 defined
over bounded functions satisfies Blackwell’s Sufficiency Conditions, therefore iterating over α1 will yield
to a unique function α∗1 from any starting point.
42 Under the given assumptions on the utility function,
the savings policy function is convex and has a right-derivative with an upper bound strictly less than one.
40This is just obtained by differentiating both sides of the functional Euler equation with respect to a. Consider a state (a, e) in which
the agent is not borrowing constrained and the policy function is differentiable. The functional Euler equation reads
u′(a(1 + r¯) + y(e, w¯)− a′(a, e; w¯)) = β(1 + r¯)E
[
u′
[
a′(a, e; w¯)(1 + r¯) + y(e, w¯)− a′(a′(a, e; w¯), e′)]]
Differentiating both sides with respect to a, I obtain
u′′(c)(1 + r¯ − ∂a
′
∂a
(a, e)) = β(1 + r¯)
∂a′
∂a
(a, e)E
[
u′′(c′)(1 + r¯ − ∂a
′
∂a
(a′, e′))
]
Observe that this equation has precisely the same structure as equation (43).
41We also need µ to be absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure to be able to use this result, more precisely, the
requirement is that the set of states in which the policy function is not differentiable has measure zero with respect to µ.
42It is easy to show that this is the set of functions that take constrained values in [−(1 + r¯), 0].
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Convexity of savings follows from concavity of consumption function (Carroll and Kimball (1996)) and the
unit upper bound on the derivative follows from a variation of the arguments provided in Carroll (2012) for
the consumption policy function under CRRA preferences.43 The sufficiency condition for contraction holds,
therefore there exists a unique fixed point α∗1.
Functions α∗0 and α
∗
1 provide us the policy function q
′(a, q, e; w¯).
B.1.2 Moments of the Distribution
Solving for the steady-state policy and allocation requires evaluation of certain moments of the distribution
in (27) and (28). Dividing these equations by γ and substituting the auxilary variable q = λ/γ, I obtain the
following expressions:
A =
∑
e
∫
u′(c)qµ(ds, e) +
1
γ
∑
e
∫
au′(c)µ(ds, e) +
∑
e
∫
au′′(c)
[
q(1 + r¯)− q′]µ(ds, e) (46)
N = (FN (K,N)−w¯)N ′(w¯)+ 1
γ
∑
e
∫
en(e, w¯)u′(c)µ(ds, e)+
∑
e
∫
en(e, w¯)u′′(c)
[
q(1+ r¯)−q′]µ(ds, e) (47)
One way to obtain the moments above is to use policy functions a′(a, e; w¯) and q′(a, q, e; w¯) to find the
limiting distribution µ(a, q, e; w¯) and evaluating these moments. Since this is computationally demanding
due to two continuous variables, I do not take this route: Due to the special structure of this problem and
the fact that I know the distribution of (a, e) at the steady state, I can iterate on the moments directly without
computing the limiting distribution.
Observe that taking the conditional expectation of (42) with respect to (a, e) and multiplying by the pdf
m(a, e; w¯), I have
E(q′|a, e)m(a, e; w¯) = α0E(q|a, e)m(a, e; w¯) + α1m(a, e; w¯)
u′′(c)(1 + r¯)
(48)
Due to the Markov structure, I can also show that
E(q′|a′, e′)m(a′, e′) =
∑
e
piee′
E(q′|a′−1(a′, e), e)m(a′−1(a′, e), e)
d
daa
′(a′−1(a′, e), e)
(49)
Starting from any initial guess f0(a, e) for E(q|a, e)m(a, e; w¯), I can apply (48) and (49) to revise the
guess, i.e. by letting f1(a′, e′) = E(q′|a′, e′)m(a′, e′; w¯). This is repeated until convergence.
Now observe that once I have the expectation of q conditional on any (a, e), all moments in (46) and (47)
43To be more precise, this upper bound is [β(1 + r¯)]1/σ where σ is the bound on the coefficient of risk aversion. Since agents behave
as if there is no uncertainty when a→∞, not surprisingly, this is equal to the slope of the linear policy function under certainty. Since
β(1 + r¯) < 1 holds in the long run, the result follows.
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can be computed by straightforward numerical integration.
B.1.3 Main Algorithm
1. Given w¯j , solve for r¯j and policy functions c(a, e; w¯j), a′(a, e; w¯j) such that at the steady state, the
modified golden rule and government budget constraint are satisfied. There is at most one such equi-
librium.
2. Solve (43) and (45) using the method described above for the policy function q′(a, q, e; w¯j).
3. Using the moment iteration method described above, calculate all the moments in (46) and (47).
4. Use (46) to solve for the unique γ that satisfies the equality.
5. Check if (47) is satisfied at this γ. If it is, stop. If not, update w¯j to w¯j+1. Let j := j + 1 and move to
step 1.
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